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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Russell Bucklew’s dilatory strategy of
refusing to bring an as-applied challenge—which he
was aware of for at least six years—until twelve days
before his execution bars him from invoking equitable
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, especially considering
the strong interest of his victims and their families in
obtaining closure and an end to re-victimization
through perpetual litigation.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE*
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (AVCV)
is an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to
promote and protect crime victims’ interests
throughout the criminal justice process. To achieve
these goals, AVCV empowers victims of crime through
legal advocacy and social services.
AVCV also
provides continuing legal education to the judiciary,
lawyers, and law enforcement.
A key part of AVCV’s mission is giving the
judiciary information and policy insights that may be
helpful in the difficult task of balancing an accused’s
constitutional rights with crime victims’ rights, while
also protecting the wider community’s need for
deterrence.
Melissa Sanders is the sister of Michael
Sanders, who was murdered by Russell Bucklew in
1996. After Michael’s murder, Melissa and her
husband took care of Michael’s two young sons, John
Michael and Zach, and she has served as the principal
contact for the Sanders family regarding the
prosecution of Russell Bucklew. She has an interest
in seeing justice carried out for her brother Michael
and in attaining closure for his other family members.

*

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represents that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party
or counsel for any party. No person or party other than
amici, its members, or its counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
All parties have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus
curiae briefs in accord with Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
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STATEMENT
In 1996, Russell Bucklew brutally murdered
Michael Sanders as his two young sons—only four and
six years old—watched their father bleed to death in
front of them. Then, as the young daughters of
Bucklew’s other victim, Stephanie Ray, cried and
wailed for their mother, Bucklew handcuffed and
dragged her away to endure hours of rape and torture.
Bucklew’s reign of terror continued when he broke out
of jail, forced victims to go into hiding, and ambushed
one victim’s mother in her own home. He was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death over 20 years ago.
Bucklew’s violent crimes exacted an unspeakably
cruel toll on his victims and their families. But that
was just the beginning of their suffering. Bucklew has
pursued a manipulative, dilatory litigation strategy
that has robbed his surviving victims of even the
smallest measure of closure and peace.
1. Stephanie Ray first met Russell Bucklew in
mid-1995. Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2,
SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (March 21, 2011), available
at https://tinyurl.com/y7ovn2wk; see also Bucklew v.
Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006). At
twenty-one years old, she was looking for someone
who could help her look after her two young girls, and
at first, she thought she might have found that
someone in Bucklew. Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part
2; see also Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 1,
SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (March 20, 2011), available
at https://tinyurl.com/yav2c22g (Ray was “all of 21” in
March of 1996). He helped her change the girls’
diapers, got them toys, and looked after them while
she was working at her job at a pottery company.
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2.
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After a few months, he moved in with her and her
daughters in a trailer in southeastern Missouri. She
had to provide for him—he used the benign tumors in
his mouth as an excuse not to work—but their
relationship nevertheless seemed to be making
progress. Ibid. She was apparently unaware of his
“extensive criminal history, including prior
convictions for trespass, assault, burglary, stealing,
driving while intoxicated, possession of marijuana,
grand theft, [and] assaulting past girlfriends.” 436
F.3d at 1014.
But Bucklew could not maintain the façade
forever, and by February 1996, Stephanie was ready
to move on. They often fought, his refusal to work was
wearing on her, and, on top of it all, she was
devastated by the loss of her baby early that year. By
Valentine’s Day, she told him they were done, and
kicked him out of her trailer. Moyers, Penalty of
Death, Part 2; State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86
(Mo. 1998).
2. Bucklew, however, was far from done. A few
weeks later, he walked into Stephanie’s trailer
unannounced. She was not there, but Michael
Sanders, her co-worker and friend, was. Bucklew
grabbed a kitchen knife, put it to Michael’s throat, and
said, “get the hell out of my house or I’m going to kill
you.” Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at
86. Bucklew let Michael leave when he explained he
was just friends with Stephanie and there to pick up
his guitar—he had been teaching her how to play.
Bucklew returned to the trailer that evening and
waited for Stephanie. When she returned from work,
he burst out from behind the door, pulled her to the
ground, dragged her to the back bedroom, pinned her
to the bed, and put a knife to her throat. Ibid. He cut
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her jaw, punched her in the face—and then,
miraculously, left. 436 F.3d at 1013.
3. But Bucklew’s campaign of terror was just
beginning. The next day, he called Stephanie at work
and vowed to kill her and her children: “If I ever see
you around that guy again, I will kill you and the kids.
I will cut them up in front of you.” Moyers, Penalty of
Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at 92-93. Stephanie was
terrified, but determined to protect her daughters.
She called the police, and got an order of protection
requiring Bucklew to stay away from them. Moyers,
Penalty of Death, Part 2; 973 S.W.2d at 86. But she
knew that was not enough—he was sure to come to
their trailer, order or no. That night, she took her
children to her mother’s. Moyers, Penalty of Death,
Part 2. The next day, Stephanie and her daughters
moved in with Michael and his two young sons. 436
F.3d at 1013.
4. But there would be no peace for Stephanie,
Michael, or their children. On the night of March 20,
1996, “Bucklew stole his nephew’s car and left with
two pistols, two sets of handcuffs, and a roll of duct
tape.” Ibid. He stalked Stephanie throughout the
day—watching her as she left work, ran errands, and
eventually returned to Michael’s trailer. Ibid. Inside
the trailer were Stephanie’s daughters and Michael’s
sons: John Michael Sanders (age six) and his brother
Zach (age four). The two boys played in the living
room as their father and Stephanie spoke in the
bedroom. Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 1.
After briefly waiting outside, Bucklew approached
Michael’s trailer and knocked on the front door.
Hearing the knock, six-year-old John Michael
unlocked the door. Ibid. Bucklew burst into the house
“with a pistol in each hand” but before he could hurt
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the children, Michael appeared and shoved them
down the hall. 973 S.W.2d at 86; Moyers, Penalty of
Death, Part 1. But that was all he could do. Bucklew
“yelled ‘get down’ and without further warning began
shooting at [Michael].” 973 S.W.2d at 86.
Slumped against the wall, his lung shredded by a
bullet, Michael tried to pacify his killer, pleading, “I’m
cool, man. I’m down.” Ibid.; Moyers, Penalty of Death,
Part 1. Unsatisfied, Bucklew “aimed the gun at
[Michael’s] head”—but was distracted by another
target. 973 S.W.2d at 86. “[W]hen he saw [Michael’s]
six-year-old son,” Bucklew “fired at the boy instead.”
Ibid. Bucklew later bragged that he thought he’d
killed the first-grader, Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part
2—but fortunately, the shot missed. 973 S.W.2d at
86.
As Michael lay dying, Stephanie stepped forward
to protect him, standing between him and his killer.
Ibid. Bucklew demanded that she drop to her knees—
and when she refused, he “pistol-whipped [Stephanie],
breaking her jaw, and knocking her to the kitchen
floor in a semi-coherent condition.” Id. at 91. He
handcuffed Stephanie, dragged her into the stolen car,
and kidnapped her “from [Michael’s] trailer as her
children cried.” Ibid.
Over the next five hours, Bucklew brutally raped
Stephanie multiple times. Later, “when she did not
perform every act [Bucklew] demanded,” Bucklew v.
State, 38 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Mo. banc 2001), he “took
her to a secluded spot and put a gun to her head and
raped her while her hands were taped in front of her
body,” 973 S.W.2d at 91. After subjecting Stephanie
to hours of torture, Bucklew was finally apprehended
when the highway patrol cornered him—but even
then they first had to defeat him in a gun battle. 38
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S.W.3d at 397. Bucklew told Stephanie that he “would
take as many police officers with him as he could in a
shootout,” 973 S.W.2d at 93—and although no officers
were killed, one was wounded—and before Bucklew
was arrested, he fired a round into Stephanie’s leg.
Scott Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3, SOUTHEAST
MISSOURIAN (March 22, 2011), available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybsz7t3b.
By the time Bucklew was apprehended, Michael
had bled to death. 973 S.W.2d at 87; 436 F.3d at 1014.
5. Even after all this, Bucklew was not done
tormenting his victims. While awaiting trial for
murder, Bucklew claimed his condition interfered
with his eating, allowing him to excuse his otherwisealarming 15-pound weight loss—which helped him fit
into a trash bag that an accomplice tossed into an
outgoing bin. Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3. As
soon as Bucklew’s escape was discovered, Stephanie
and her daughters were placed in protective custody,
and her mother, Barbara, stayed at a hotel with her
boyfriend Ed Frenzel. Ibid.
After two days at the hotel, Barbara and Ed
returned home—with a police escort—to collect a few
belongings. Ibid. After their escort swept the home
and gave the all clear, they spent an hour or so tidying
up, until Barbara went to check the lock on the back
door. As she turned to walk back to the living room,
Bucklew burst out of a closet and ambushed her. 436
F.3d at 1014; Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3.
Screaming “[y]ou’re going to die,” Bucklew attacked
the couple with a knife and hammer, but they
managed to escape their home with their lives.
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 3.
6. Bucklew was eventually recaptured and
convicted in state court of murder, kidnapping, and
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rape. He was sentenced to death, and the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed his sentence on direct
appeal. 973 S.W.2d 83. Bucklew’s state and federal
habeas petitions were denied as well. See 38 S.W.3d
395; 436 F.3d 1010.
7. With normal avenues of review exhausted,
Bucklew adopted a new strategy to avoid the
execution of his sentence—bring a facial challenge to
Missouri’s lethal injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, but keep an as-applied challenge (based on his
benign oral tumors) in reserve, ready to use when
most strategically advantageous.
Having exploited his condition to escape from jail
over a decade before, Bucklew was well aware of his
symptoms—and that they might provide some basis
for an as-applied challenge. In June 2008, Bucklew
filed a pleading asking for $7,200 to hire a medical
expert to support a clemency application—and
supported his request by claiming that, because of his
condition, “execution by lethal injection may pose a
substantial and intolerable risk of inflicting serious
harm and excruciating pain.” Resp. App. at 798a. His
2008 filing included extensive argument that
“Bucklew will suffer the risk of serious harm
amounting to cruel and unusual punishment during
the administration of Missouri’s lethal injection
protocol in light of his affliction with cavernous
hemangioma.” Id. at 796a. It even stated that
Bucklew sought to demonstrate that Missouri’s
procedure was unconstitutional “as applied uniquely
to Mr. Bucklew.” Id. at 797a (emphasis in original).
Yet despite his obvious awareness of a possible asapplied challenge based on his condition, Bucklew
refused for years to bring such a challenge. Instead,
he brought or joined a series of facial challenges—
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always ensuring that his as-applied challenge was at
the ready for later use.
Bucklew first attempted to intervene in a pending
facial challenge to Missouri’s injection procedure in
July 2008, when he moved to intervene in Clemons v.
Crawford, 2:07-CV-04129 (W.D. Mo.). Just two weeks
earlier, the Missouri Supreme Court denied his
motion to reconsider its previous order granting the
State’s motion to set execution dates “in due course.”
Dkt. 78 at 3, Clemons v. Crawford, 2:07-CV-04129
(W.D. Mo.). To postpone execution, Bucklew moved to
intervene in the federal case—arguing, repeatedly,
that he was identically situated to the other plaintiffs
(none of whom had his condition). See id. at 8,
(“Timeliness is no objection to the intervention of a
person who fits the model of the other plaintiffs to the
extent that [Bucklew] does”); ibid. (“the risks of severe
pain that [Bucklew] faces are the same as those that
plaintiffs face”); id. at 9 (“By virtue of their common
stake in a positive outcome, Mr. Bucklew’s interests
are bound up with those of the four [plaintiffs]”); ibid.
(claiming Bucklew would “adopt by reference” any
pleadings filed by the other plaintiffs).
After Bucklew’s attempt at intervention was
denied, Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1129
(8th Cir. 2009), he joined a different challenge
claiming Missouri’s protocol was preempted by the
Federal Controlled Substances Act and the Federal
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Dkt. 6, Ringo v.
Lombardi, 2:09-CV-04095 (W.D. Mo.). That action
was dismissed as moot when Missouri was no longer
able to procure the drugs necessary to implement its
protocol—and, up through the end of the case,
Bucklew gave no indication that his position varied
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from any other plaintiff on death row. See Ringo v.
Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2012).
A few months after that action was dismissed,
Bucklew joined another group of death-row plaintiffs
in a facial Eighth Amendment challenge to the new
drug protocol—arguing that Missouri’s 2012 protocol
posed “an objectively intolerable risk of severe pain”
for any capital defendant. Dkt. 1-2 at 13, In re
Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.). After Missouri
implemented the current pentobarbital protocol in
October 2013, Bucklew joined an amended complaint
challenging that protocol—again on facial grounds,
and without any suggestion that it might be uniquely
unconstitutional as applied to him. Dkt. 183, In re
Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.).
The district court in that case issued a discovery
order requiring that the identities of the physician,
pharmacist, and laboratory involved in prescribing
and procuring the pentobarbital be disclosed—and the
Eighth Circuit vacated the order, effectively holding
that the facial challenge was meritless given the
failure to identify an alternative means of execution.
In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2014). On
remand, Bucklew—along with the other plaintiffs—
refused to plead a feasible alternative, and their
Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed. Dkt. 443,
In re Lombardi, 2:12-cv-04209 (W.D. Mo.).
8. On May 9, 2014, less than two weeks before his
scheduled execution, Bucklew finally brought his asapplied challenge. App. at 1; Bucklew v. Lombardi,
783 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2015). Having held that
challenge in reserve for years, Bucklew was able to
secure a stay of execution from this Court while
Missouri’s other capital defendants could not, see 783
F.3d at 1123–24, and he staved off dismissal of his
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new as-applied claims despite the dismissal of the
other defendants’ facial challenges. Id. at 1129.
Even while litigating this “new” claim, Bucklew
was careful to preserve as many opportunities for
future litigation as possible. Required to plead an
“alternative” execution method, Bucklew vaguely
argued that “lethal gas” could be a comparatively less
painful option. Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087,
1094 (8th Cir. 2018). But Bucklew was also careful to
preserve his ability to argue against the use of gas,
should it ever somehow become available.1 On one
hand, Bucklew argued that the State could not
affirmatively disprove the viability of lethal gas at
summary judgment—while on the other hand, he
ensured that his own expert did not actually endorse
lethal gas as an alternative method. Id. at 1094–95.
If lethal gas ever does become available, Bucklew will
assuredly point to his own expert’s testimony to argue
that lethal gas is unconstitutional as applied to him.
9. The district court and the court of appeals saw
through Bucklew’s strategy and held that, even after
“extensive discovery,” he had not made any real effort
to discern what procedures would actually be used at
his execution—and thus could not show that any such
procedures would be more painful than his “lethal
gas” alternative. 883 F.3d at 1096 (“Bucklew simply
asserts that, in comparing execution by lethal
injection and by lethal gas, we must accept his
speculation that defendants will employ these riskincreasing procedures.”). As the Eighth Circuit noted,
1

Of course, even if Bucklew had conceded the constitutionality
of lethal gas, it is unlikely that such a concession would ever
have any practical effect on him given that Missouri has not
used gas for executions since 1965, and its only gas chamber
sits in a museum. Ibid; App. at 487.
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Bucklew successfully prolonged his as-applied
challenge in 2015 by arguing for the necessity of
further fact-finding—and then showed no interest in
that fact-finding once his challenge was revived. Id.
at 1095.
Specifically, three years before, Bucklew argued
that the Eighth Circuit should reverse the dismissal
of his complaint to allow him to take further discovery
regarding what changes the State could make to its
protocol to accommodate his condition—because
without knowing the exact parameters of the protocol,
Bucklew could not effectively argue against them. Id.
at 1095. But once Bucklew secured reversal and
remand, he stopped caring about what changes
Missouri would make to its procedures, and did
nothing to determine what, exactly, the effects of
those procedures would be with respect to his
condition. Id. at 1096. The district court ruled for the
State and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1097.

I.

ARGUMENT
Decades-Long
Delays
In
Obtaining
Justice Inflict Immeasurable Harm On
Victims’ Families.

For more than two decades, the pain and grief
suffered by Michael Sanders’ family—including his
two boys who watched their father die at Bucklew’s
hands—has been compounded by the interminable
delays in executing Bucklew’s sentence. Although
there is no doubt that Bucklew murdered Michael
Sanders—and assaulted, kidnapped, and raped
Stephanie Ray—their families continue to await
justice and closure. And they are not alone. Across
the Nation, victims suffer immeasurable harm from
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decades-long delays in executing sentences—delays
that rob victims’ families of even a modicum of peace
and closure.
A.

The Family Members Of Bucklew’s
Victims Continue To Be Victimized
By His Dilatory And Manipulative
Litigation Tactics.

The suffering of Michael Sanders’ family has been
relentlessly exacerbated by decades of undue delays
and manipulative litigation tactics.
John Michael Sanders still remembers rushing to
his father’s motionless body after Bucklew shot him
and abducted Stephanie. Moyers, Penalty of Death,
Part 1, supra. He remembers his father struggling to
speak to him before dying of his wounds. And he often
replays that day in his head, blaming himself—then
all of six years old—for unlocking the door when
Bucklew knocked. “I thought if I hadn’t unlocked the
door, he wouldn’t have been able to kick it open,” he
remarked in a 2011 news article. Ibid. “There could
have been a different ending,” he mused—one where
his father’s murder, Stephanie’s abduction, and
Bucklew’s escape never happened. Sometimes, John
Michael dreams that his father gets to watch him and
his brother grow up, graduate high school, and begin
happy lives for themselves. Ibid. “I dream that
because I guess there’s a part of me that still wants to
believe that,” he says. John Michael believes that
Bucklew deserves the death penalty and that
Bucklew’s execution will grant him closure. Until
then, he finds it difficult to fully move on. Ibid.
Zach, John Michael’s younger brother, has had
similar difficulties dealing with his father’s brutal
murder while Bucklew indefinitely prolongs this
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litigation and delays the execution of his sentence.
Zach—whose first memory is his father’s murder—
“has suffered through nights of fitful sleep, bad
dreams and occasionally has awakened, crying.” Ibid.
Like John Michael, Zach believes that Bucklew’s
execution will help him fully come to terms with what
has happened. Both brothers have expressed their
willingness to attend the execution, and finally
experience some closure and finality. Ibid.
Michael Sanders’ father, Jerry, his mother
Dorothy, and his sister, amicus Melissa Sanders—
who helped raise John Michael and Zach—have also
borne the pain of undue delays which have taken a
great toll on their lives and denied them peace. “I’m
angry about it. Yeah, you bet,” Jerry Sanders told a
reporter. “It’s gotten to where I deal with it easier,
but to see [Bucklew] go would give me peace of mind.
It would put me to rest. I really think it would.” Scott
Moyers, Penalty of Death, Part 4, Southeast
Missourian (March 23, 2011), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7asb8bw.
Michael’s sister
Melissa agrees that Bucklew’s sentence should have
been carried out years ago. Ibid. But over 20 years
after Bucklew was sentenced to death, they are still
waiting for justice and closure.
B.

Research Confirms What The
Experience
of
Victims
Makes
Plain—Undue
Delays
in
the
Administration of Justice Harm
Victims of Violent Crimes.

Not surprisingly, the academic literature confirms
what the experiences of families like the Sanders
makes painfully clear—long after the immediate loss
and physical trauma are over, crime victims and their
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loved ones continue to suffer from psychological
wounds that refuse to heal.
Courts frequently
overlook the ways in which delayed proceedings
compound that harm and exacerbate the initial
injuries victims suffer.
It is well known, of course, that violent crime
inflicts various immediate psychological traumas on
victims and those close to them. Most obviously, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is commonly
documented among the victims of violent crime. See
Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of
Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental
Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress 182, 182 (2010); Dean G.
Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of
Crime Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J.
Traum. Stress 119, 119 (2003). PTSD can afflict not
only the direct victims of violent crime, but also those
who experience its profound repercussions more
indirectly, such as family members and friends.
Kilpatrick & Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime
Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. Traum.
Stress at 125–27 (2003).
PTSD is far from the only wound that violent
crime can inflict on victims. Depression, substance
abuse, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and suicide also
number among them. Parsons & Bergin, The Impact
of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental
Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress at 182. All of these
injuries are compounded when the adjudicative
process is subject to dilatory maneuvering and
gamesmanship.
Of course, from the victim’s perspective,
proceedings rarely move quickly enough—“trial is
typically delayed through scheduling conflicts,
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continuances,
and
other
unexpected
delays
throughout the course of the trial.” Mary Beth Ricke,
Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings,
Improvements, and Alternatives to Legislative
Protection, 41 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 181, 183 (2013).
“Victims of the crimes are already heightened
emotionally with anxiety and anticipation of the
impending trial, and these delays lead to further and
unnecessary trauma.” Ibid. It thus is not surprising
that “multiple studies” demonstrate “the negative
effect on a victim’s healing process when there is a
prolonged trial of the alleged attacker because the
actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.” Id.
at 193; Ulrich Orth & Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of
Perpetrators
Retraumatize
Victims?,
19
J.
Interpersonal Violence 212, 215 (2004). “The years of
delay exact an enormous physical, emotional, and
financial toll” on victims. Dan S. Levey, Balancing the
Scales of Justice, 89 Judicature 289, 291 (2006); see
also Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What
They Say at the End: Capital Victims' Families and
the Press, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 492 (2003) (“Ending
this painful process can become a major goal for the
victim’s family-- sometimes the only realizable goal of
the execution.”).
Abundant academic literature thus confirms what
common sense and experience make plain. A victim’s
experience with the criminal justice system—
particularly when the process is long-delayed,
convoluted, and seemingly never-ending—compounds
the initial effects of violent crime. See Ricke, Victims’
Right, 41 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y at 182-183; see also
Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime
Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. Traum.
Stress 159, 159 (2003). A victim’s experience with the
criminal justice system often “means the difference
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between a healing experience and one that
exacerbates the initial trauma.” Parsons & Bergin,
The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on
Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress at 182.
The harm caused by drawn-out criminal justice
proceedings is especially acute in cases involving
capital punishment, such as this one, which often
involve decades of delay and false stops and starts
before the case is finally over. Delay in death penalty
cases means that “[c]hildren who were infants when
their loved ones were murdered are now, as adults,
still dealing with the complexities of the criminal
justice system.” Levey, Balancing the Scales of
Justice, 89 Judicature at 290.
“The automatic appeals, and often repeated
appeals,” in death penalty cases “are continually
brutal on victim family members.” Ibid. “Year after
year, survivors summon the strength to go to court,
schedule time off work, and relive the murder of their
loved ones over and over again . . . . The years of delay
exact an enormous physical, emotional, and financial
toll.” Id. at 290–91. The delays also keep family
members from experiencing a sense of “closure”—the
“hope that they will be able to put the murder behind
them.” Gross & Matheson, What They Say at the End,
88 Cornell L. Rev. at 489, 490-94.
II.

Bucklew’s Manipulative And Dilatory
Suit—Based On A Claim He Refused To
Bring For Years—Exemplifies The Toll
Exacted On Victims Of Violent Crime As
They Wait For Justice And Closure.

The Eighth Circuit properly put an end to
Bucklew’s decades-long abusive litigation, strategic
posturing, and dilatory tactics—and its judgment
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should be affirmed. For as long as this Court has
recognized § 1983 method-of-execution claims, it has
also recognized the potential for their abuse. See, e.g.,
Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of California,
503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (rejecting
method-of-execution challenge and explaining that
“[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s
strong interest in proceeding with its judgment and
Harris’ obvious attempt at manipulation.”). And this
Court has held that “[b]oth the State and the victims
of crime have an important interest in the timely
enforcement of a sentence” that should be protected
by dismissing abusive § 1983 suits.
Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (citing Gomez).
In Hill, this Court held that capital defendants
could sometimes step outside the habeas framework
and use § 1983 to challenge the method of their
planned execution. Id. at 583. At the same time, the
Court recognized the obvious potential for abuse in
using § 1983 as a procedural vehicle given that, among
other things, such suits are not subject to the bar on
successive habeas petitions—and warned that
repetitive, dilatory, and strategic § 1983 suits should
not be allowed to trump the interest of victims. Id. at
584. The Court explained that its decisions upholding
§ 1983 method-of-execution suits “do not diminish
that interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the
means to protect it.” Ibid. This is so, in part, because
“the ‘last-minute nature of an application’ or an
applicant's ‘attempt at manipulation’ of the judicial
process may be grounds for denial of a stay” or other
relief. Ibid. (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654).
Although Hill was most directly concerned with
stay applications, it approvingly cited cases that
applied the same reasoning to dismiss outright
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“[r]epetitive or piecemeal” § 1983 claims. Id. at 584–
85 (noting courts’ use of their equitable authority “to
dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late
in the day” as an example of how “dilatory or
speculative suits” could be addressed); id. at 584
(citing White v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir.
2005), which dismissed a § 1983 action because the
claimant “has been on death row for more than six
years, and only now, with his execution imminent, has
decided to challenge a procedure for lethal injection
that the State has been using for his entire stay on
death row”).
It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate case
for exercising equitable authority to protect crime
victims against repeated manipulation of the judicial
process than this one. Bucklew refused to make his
as-applied challenge until the last moment—a mere
12 days before his execution—despite his awareness
of the availability of such a challenge at least 6 years
earlier. See White, 429 F.3d at 574 (dismissing § 1983
method-of-execution challenge where the claimant
was aware of its availability “for more than six years”
and only brought it “with his execution imminent”).
Despite virtually unlimited opportunities to bring
(and have resolved) any as-applied claims during that
six-year period, Bucklew chose not to do so. Even
after he was finally forced to bring his claim, he has
been careful to avoid any real merits determination—
arguing that a lethal gas procedure Missouri has not
used for 50 years could possibly be constitutional,
while offering the testimony of an expert who claims
that no procedure whatsoever, gas or otherwise, could
be satisfactory.
Unless the judgment below is affirmed, Bucklew
will continue to bring suit after suit for no purpose
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other than drawing out these proceedings and
dragging his victims through as many years of
litigation as he possibly can. The “important interest”
of crime victims that this Court recognized in Hill
should be vindicated here by holding that the equities
lie with the victims who have been denied peace and
closure for over two decades—and affirming the
judgment below on that ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
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